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The Commerce Clause Held No Limitation to the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts-Wahl v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.*
Three wrongful death actions were brought in a federal district
court in New York by United States citizens as survivors of passengers
killed in the crash in Turkey of an airplane owned and operated
by defendant Middle East Airlines (MEA). MEA is a Lebanese corporation operating in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa, whose
United States sales are made by its general sales agent, Pan American
World Ainvays, Inc. The court held that maintaining a New York
office and entering into a general sales agency agreement with
Pan American to promote travel on MEA of passengers originating
in the United States were sufficient minimum contacts to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction over MEA in New York for any legitimate consequences of such activity. The court granted a motion for
reargument, however, to hear the contention that the assertion of
jurisdiction over MEA would constitute an undue burden on commerce with foreign nations in violation of the commerce clause. On
reargument, held, affirmed. Although such an action in a state court
may unconstitutionally burden commerce, when the action is
brought in a federal court the burden cannot be unconstitutional
since the commerce clause is a limitation upon state and not federal
power.
In Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co.,1 the United States Supreme Court declared invalid as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce a state statute providing for service of process on a
foreign railroad corporation. In announcing the doctrine that the
negative implications of the commerce clause2 provided a possible
defense to the assertion of jurisdiction, the Court stated that the
orderly and effective administration of justice does not require a
foreign carrier to submit to a suit by a nonresident of the forum
state in a jurisdiction which is remote from where the cause of action
• 227 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
I. 262 U.S. 312 (1923). See generally Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1075 (1936).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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arose and in which the carrier neither owns nor operates any
facilities. 3
Decisions subsequent to Davis indicate that the Court is reluctant to extend that decision beyond its facts. 4 Thus, the commerce
clause objection may be raised only against the maintenance of a
suit on a cause of action arising outside of the forum state5 against
a foreign corporation not operating in the forum state.6 Although the
rationale of Davis extends to any legal entity in interstate commerce,
it is questionable whether the defense is available other than to
incorporated common carriers. 7 Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state is often sufficient to dispose of
the defense. 8 In addition, courts have had little difficulty in finding
that the defendant carries on sufficient activities in the forum state
to obviate the commerce clause objection.9 However, regardless of
the concern in Davis about the dilatory effect on commerce caused
by the necessity of removing trained employees from their jobs to
appear as witnesses •in distant forums, 10 later decisions indicate that
there has been no incorporation of a requirement of distant witnesses to limit this defense. 11 Although this defense is of limited
3. 262 U.S. at 317.
4. See International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934);
Denver &: R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix,
278 U.S. 492 (1929); Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21 (1927); Missouri
ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924). See generally Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 17 MINN. L. REV'. 381 (1933); McGowan,
Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 33 ILL. L. REV. 875 (1939); Comment,
45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1114-17 (1936); 44 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1931).
5. See Farrier, supra note 4, at 393-95; McGowan, supra note 4, at 880-82;
Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1114-17 (1936).
6. See generally Farrier, supra note 4, at 393-95 (1933); McGowan, supra note 4,
at 880-82 (1939); 42 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1929).
7. See Standard Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 538, 62 A.2d 454
(1948), appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 930 (1949). But see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956) (semble); Uhlich v. Hilton Mobile
Homes, 126 N.W.2d 813 (S.D. 1964). See generally McGowan, supra note 4, at 882;
Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 1100, 1117 (1936).
8. See Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 157 F.2d 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947); Barnett v. Texas &: P. Ry., 145 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1944);
Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Sullivan, 126 F.2d 433, 438-40 (1st Cir. 1942); Isenberg v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 82 F. Supp. 927, 928 (D. Mass. 1949). But see Zuber v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 82 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., 278 S.W.2d
749 (Mo. 1955).
9. See Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., supra note 8; Barnett v. Texas & P. Ry.,
supra note 8; Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951);
Western Smelting &: Ref. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 81 F. Supp. 494 (D. Neb. 1948);
Gregg Co. v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot-Maatschappij N.V., 205 Misc.
378, 128 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Munic. Ct. New York 1953). But see Overstreet v. Canadian
Pac. Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
supra note 8; Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Hayman v. Southern Pac. Co., supra note 8.
10. 262 U.S. at 315.
11. International Milling v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1934); Denver &

April 1965]

Recent Developments

1117

vitality today, 12 it continues to be verbalized13 and occasionally to
be successfully invoked. 14
While recognizing its limited scope, the federal courts have not
agreed on whether the defense of an undue burden on commerce
can be asserted in the federal courts in an ordinary diversity action.
One view is represented by Overstreet v. Canadian Pacific Airlines,15
where a district court on the authority of Davis dismissed the suit
as an unconstitutional burden on commerce. Another view was
expressed in Wadell v. Green Textile Associates,16 where a district
court found the defendant subject to jurisdiction conferred by the
general diversity jurisdiction and venue statutes.17 Since it is clear
that Congress has the constitutional power to burden commerce,18
the court reasoned that congressional action in conferring jurisdiction was an exercise of that power. 19 A third view, expressed in Wahl,
is that actions brought originally in federal courts on a diversity
basis can never unduly burden commerce since the negative implications of the commerce clause limit state but not federal power.
It would seem difficult to maintain the position of Wadell thati
merely because the action is proper under the general venue and
jurisdiction provisions, Congress has exercised its power to burden
commerce by permitting jurisdiction to be asserted over a foreign
corporation having only a general sales agent in the forum state.
In Baltimore i:t Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 20 the United States Supreme
Court did hold that the venue provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act21 compelled the federal courts to adjudicate any action
that was proper under those provisions.22 The Court found, howR.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932). See McGowan, supra note 4, at 886-87; 32
COLUM. L. REV. 541 (1937).

12. See 33 IND. L.J. 358 (1958).
13. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 104 Ga. App. 200, 121 S.E.2d 4ll
(1961); Barrett v. '.Boston &: Me. R.R., 104 N.H. 70, 178 A.2d 291 (1962); Fuss v.
French Nat'l R.R., 35 Misc. 2d 680, 231 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
14. See, e.g., Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prod. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn.
1961) (semble); Glaser v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 N.J. Super. 16, 196 A.2d 539 (Law Div.
1963).

15. 152 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); accord, Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 F.
Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); Klepper v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 271 App. Div. 53, 62 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1946);
Cotugno v. Union Pac. Ry., 12 Misc. 2d 235, 177, N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
16. 92 F. Supp. 738 (D.C. Mass. 1950); accord, Cooke v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., 105 F.
Supp. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1952): Brown v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 25 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.Y.
1938).
17. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1332, 1391 (1958).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Ferguson v. Ford Motor
Co., 77 F. Supp. 425, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
19. 92 F. Supp. at 742.
20. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
21. 35 Stat. 291 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
22. 314 U.S. at 54. Compare Jablonski v. Southern Pac. Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022, 1023
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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ever, that Congress specifically intended those special venue provisions to have that effect.23 On the contrary, the general diversity
power given the federal courts has not been interpreted to compel
adjudication. 24 Significantly, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,25 the
Court held that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins26 precludes
federal courts from entertaining diversity actions barred in state
courts by "door-closing" statutes.27 Although Congress has the power
to permit the federal courts to adjudicate these suits,28 the grant of
general diversity power has not been considered an exercise of this
power.29 In terms of the implied effect of the general diversity
provisions to override limitations on federal adjudicatory power, it
would seem inconsistent with the approach in Woods, therefore,
to limit the Davis doctrine by holding that the general diversity
provisions are an exercise of congressional power to burden commerce by permitting suits in federal courts which Davis prohibits
in state courts.
The intimation in Wahl that the Davis doctrine is inapplicable
in the federal courts because the commerce clause limits only state
power30 is interesting, but unsupported. It is true that the Supreme
Court has never considered a defense based on Davis in a case arising
in the federal courts.31 However, the rationale of the Court in Davis
23. 314 U.S. at 49-50. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as
Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 15 n.21
(1949).
24. This was explicitly recognized in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505
(1947), a forum non conveniens case, in which the Court, discussing the Kepner line
of cases, said that: "Those decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to
other cases governed by the general venue statutes." Another example of the absence
of compulsion under the general diversity provisions is the abstention doctrine, which
prevents federal courts from hearing certain diversity cases in which the controlling
state law is not clear. See, e.g., Louisiana Power &: Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
25. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
26. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27. See also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). See generally Meador, State
Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082, 1094-96 (1963).
28. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
29. See generally Hill, ,The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev.
541, 570 (1958); Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39
IND. L.J. 228, 249 (1964).
30. 227 F. Supp. at 841. If the court is correct that the commerce clause limits
ouly state power, an argnment that the federal courts would still have to follow
state law under Erie is possible. If, in addition to the constitutional limitation, the
state has an affirmative policy in its refusal to assert jurisdiction, for example the
encouragement of limited activities in the state by foreign corporations, Erie would
seem applicable. Certainly, there is no absolute due process right to sue in an
American court. See Comment, 103 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 830 (1955). In the absence of an
affirmative state policy, however, it is clear that Erie would not preclude the federal
courts from adjudicating the suit. Cf. Hill, supra note 29, at 570-71; Weintraub, supra
note 29, at 249-51.
31. In Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924), the Court held that
the enforcement of a judgment obtained in a state court against a foreign railroad
corporation in violation of the Davis doctrine could be enjoined by a federal court.
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that the general submission of common carriers to suit will unreasonably obstruct commerce applies as well to the federal courts,82
and the language of the Court broadly encompasses suits in both
court systems.33 Moreover, since the power to regulate commerce
is vested in the legislative branch of the federal government,34 it
would seem that the federal courts have no power to burden commerce. This question seems analogous to that question of executive
power presented in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 35
where there were at least four different views among the Justices
of the Supreme Court as to whether the President could exerci~e
any powers which fell within the legislative powers of Congress.36
Nevertheless, each member of that Court considered ali powers of
the President to regulate commerce to be delegated powers.37 It
would seem clear by analogy, therefore, that the federal courts
could not burden commerce in the absence of congressional delegation of that power to them. 38 The inability to find a specific intent
in the general diversity provisions to burden commerce, as existed
in Kepner, would seem to preclude finding such a delegation.
Although its range of application has been narrowed, 39 the commerce clause still remains a possible defense to jurisdiction, particularly appropriate to common carriers in foreign commerce. As a
constitutional method of adjusting place of trial, analogous to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens,40 its value has diminished with
the expanded use of that doctrine. 41 Nevertheless, as long as the
Supreme Court does not view the Davis doctrine as discretionary, 42
32. See Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923), where the
Court took notice "that litigation in States and jurisdictions remote from that in
which the cause of action arose entails absence of employees from their customary
occupations." (Emphasis added.)
33. Id. at 315-17.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
36. See Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case-Congress, the President and the Supreme
Court, 51 MICH. L. REv. 141, 177 (1952). Justices Black and Douglas considered the
President powerless to act in the sphere of legislative powers of Congress without
express authorization. See ibid.
37. Id. at 175. See also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
38. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), where the argument was made that the
federal courts could not enjoin conduct interfering with interstate commerce unless
authorized to do so by Congress. The Court sustained the injunction on the basis
of a finding of congressional policy. See Kauper, supra note 36, at 148.
39. See notes 4-14 supra and accompanying text.
40. See Farrier, supra note 4, at 392.
41. See generally Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L.
REv. 380 (1947); Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 740 (1962).
42. Mr. Justice Jackson viewed Davis as really a forum non conveniens case.
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 31 (1945). See also Bickel, supra note 23, at 17 n.28. This view has been
criticized. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908, 913
(1947).
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as is forum non conveniens, and as long as there is no specific congressional authorization to burden commerce by permitting suits in
the federal courts in these situations, the defense to the assertion of
jurisdiction of an undue burden on commerce must be considered
applicable in the federal courts.

